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Who Should We Ask? Employer and Employee Perceptions of Skill Gaps 
within Firms 
1 Introduction  
There is now a considerable literature on the issue of skill mismatches (see CEDEFOP 2010 
for a summary) with the majority of studies demonstrating that an inadequate alignment 
between the human capital of workers and firm-level requirements is costly on a number of 
fronts: workers’ earnings, job satisfaction, job turnover and training participation 
(McGuinness, 2006, Verhaerst & Omey, 2006, McGuinness & Wooden, 2010), Mavromaras 
et al, 2013). However, to date, the mismatch literature has focused almost exclusively on the 
impacts of overeducation and overskilling, and has largely ignored the impacts of skill gaps 
at the level of the individual or firm. Skill gaps describe the scenario whereby the skill levels 
of the existing workforce are insufficient to meet the organisational-level performance 
requirements of the firm. The lack or research is particularly surprising given that skill gaps 
represent a primary motivating factor in the training investment decisions of both firms and 
workers. Skill gaps have the potential to harm firm-level productivity as average worker 
productivity is likely to be lower in the presence of substantial skill gaps; skill gaps will also 
tend to inflate average labour costs as organisations require more workers per unit of 
output. Finally, firm-level profitability will be adversely impacted by skill gaps as a 
consequence of the additional training and recruitment investments that arise as a direct 
consequence of skill gaps.   
A limited number of studies do address the issue of skill gaps on firm-level performance. 
Using data from the UK national employment survey (2003), Tether et al (2005) reported 
that over one fifth of sampled firms believed that skill gaps delayed the introduction of new 
products, with a third also stating that such gaps represented a barrier to introducing new 
work practices, A series of Northern Ireland sectoral studies (NIERC,2000; 2001; 2002; ERINI, 
2005), also reported descriptive evidence that skill gaps substantially hampered firm-level 
performance through lower productivity, a failure to meet deadlines and lower product 
quality. Finally, Forth & Mason (2004) report that ICT skill gaps negatively impacted 
company sales performance within a sample of UK firms employing ICT professionals. 
Nevertheless, given the potential importance of skill gaps for both firm-level performance 
and training decisions, the existing research in the area is limited and largely descriptive.  
This paper seeks to address this gap in the literature by providing a robust empirical 
assessment of the impact of skill gaps on firm-level training and labour costs. 
In addition to a lack of information on the impacts of skill gaps, it is unclear from the 
literature to what the principal drivers of skill gaps are or exactly how the phenomena 
should be measured. Skill gaps can be measured on the basis of the subjective views of both 
workers and firms. It is unclear to what extent the approach adopted to measuring skill gaps 
matters. By assessing the factors that drive any misalignment between employer and 
employee views on worker competencies, the research will seek to identify the main factors 
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driving differences between the views of management and workers.  We will also consider 
the extent to which the impacts of skill gaps vary according to the measurement approach 
adopted.  
The paper has two central aims (1) to assess the determinants and relationship between skill 
gaps measured from the perspective for employers and employees and (2) to measure the 
impact of skill gaps on firm-level performance.  The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 
describes the data and methods used in the study, Section 3 outlines the central results 
arising from the analysis and Section 4 provides conclusions and policy recommendations.  
2 Data and methods 
For the study, we have used the 2006 National Employment Survey (NES), an [employer-
employee matched] workplace survey carried out by the Irish Central Statistics Office. The 
NES covers both the public and private sectors1. The data covers the very height of the Irish 
economic boom, during which time unemployment was low and labour market conditions 
tight. We would reasonably expect the impacts of skill gaps to be at their height during 2006, 
as the rapid pace of growth and the relative scarcity of available skilled labour would have 
made it more difficult to eliminate skill gaps through external recruitment. The employer 
sample was drawn from the CSO’s Central Business Register. Selected firms were asked to 
extract a systematic sample of employees from their payrolls. Approximately 6,500 private 
sector employers and 300 public sector bodies were surveyed across the economy2. Within 
this, a total sample of 60,000 employees was included from the private sector and 29,000 
from the public sector.  
The employer questionnaire requested information on employee earnings, hours worked 
and occupation3. Information was also obtained on firm size, sector, the use of pay 
agreements, HRM procedures, etc. Employees were issued with a separate questionnaire 
within which they provided information on their age, gender, educational attainment, 
employment status (part-time or full-time), length of time in paid employment, length of 
service with current employer and also other job-related characteristics (for example, trade 
union membership, shift-work etc). Both employers and employees were asked similar 
questions regarding the existence of skill gaps. Employers were asked to indicate the 
competency areas where they believed that employees had gaps in their skill, while 
employees were asked to indicate if, for their current job, they required training in any 
                                                          
1  While the NES was of enterprises with 3 plus employees, the results were calibrated to the Quarterly 
National Household Survey (QNHS) employment data for employees (excluding agriculture, forestry and 
fishing), which covers all employees.  
2  Only employers with more than three employees were surveyed and the data were collected at the 
enterprise level.  
3  The earnings information collected in the 2003 NES represents the gross monthly amount payable by the 
organisation to its employees, and relates to the month of March in 2003. This includes normal wages, 
salaries and overtime; taxable allowances, regular bonuses and commissions; and holiday or sick pay for the 
period in question. It does not include employer’s Pay Related Social Insurance (PRSI), redundancy payments 
and back pay. 
4 
competency area.  Data was collected on both employer and employee skill gaps in the 
following 15 competency areas: communication skills, customer services skills, general IT 
skills, professional IT skills, language skills (English and foreign), literacy skills, numeracy 
skills, management skills, technical & practical skills and other skills. 
Given that our objective is to assess the degree of alignment on perceptions of skill gaps 
within organisations and to measure the impacts of gaps of measures on firm-level 
performance, we reduce our linked employer-employee data to the level of the firm by 
retaining one observation per organisation. We retain information from the employer survey 
and derived variables for each organisation based on average employee responses. We 
apply establishment-level weights to our firm-level observations in order to ensure that our 
data is representative of the population of firms in Ireland during 2006. Our sample is 
restricted to private sector organisations on the grounds that expenditures on training and 
labour costs within public sector organisations are less likely to be sensitive to market forces. 
After excluding missing data we retain an effective sample of 4035 private sector companies 
firms.  
Moving onto the econometric analysis, our specifications are based on the assumption that 
our key outcome variables at the level of the firm will be driven by a combination of the 
human capital characteristics of the workforce and a range of organisational attributes. 
Given this, we estimate the following equations: 
 
1 2 iAgree H Fα β β ε= + + +                         (1) 
 
1 2 3 i iY H F gap gapα β β β λ ε= + + + + +  (2) 
 
1 2 3Tc H F Gapi gapiα β β β λ ε= + + + + +  (3) 
 
Agree is a binary variable indicating that both employers and employees believe that a skill 
gap exists. Agree takes the value of one if employers indicate that a skill gap exists and 20 
per cent of employees within the organisation also report a need for training in that 
particular area. While the 20 per cent cut off point is somewhat arbitrary, we argue that it 
represents a level of deficiency that is sufficiently high so as to represent a concern for 
employers4. H  denotes the mean human capital characteristics of the workforce which are 
derived from average employee responses, F relates to firm level characteristics taken from 
the employer component of the sample and ε is the error term. Firm level controls included 
in the model relate to firm-size, sector, the mode of wage bargaining and HRM variables 
                                                          
4  This is particularly the case as the NES sample is skewed towards larger firms. 
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related to the proportion of staff subject to an annual performance review or in receipt of a 
job description. The human capital related variables are derived on the basis of average 
worker characteristics and include the proportion of workers with varying levels of 
education, the shares of migrants, shift workers and workers belonging to professional 
bodies, the level of trade union density, the average level of labour market experience 
among the workforce and the proportion of workers who were consulted by management 
on matters relating to organisational change.   
With respect to equations 2 and 3, Y  represents average firm labour costs and Tc average 
training costs, Gap is a binary variable indicating that a skill gap exists, while gapλ denotes a 
Heckman selection term (Heckman (1974) that accounts for the possibility that the incidence 
of skill gaps is non-random with respect to average earnings and / or training costs. Average 
labour costs are derived on the basis of the average gross monthly salary paid to responding 
employees within the firm, while average training costs are calculated by dividing total 
annual expenditures on training (course fees, travel and subsistence, costs of premises) by 
the number of employees in company sponsored training programmes during the year.  
3 Results 
Congruence or agreement between employers’ and employees’ perception of skill 
gaps 
It is unclear to what extent worker’s and employer’s perceptions of skill gaps are correlated. 
There are considerable grounds to believe that the level of correlation may not be as great 
as might be imagined. Employers may report skill gaps in isolation if (a) employees 
overestimate their own competency levels (b) employers under-estimate the competency 
levels of their workforce, or (c) employees fail to recognise instances where their skill 
deficiencies have important implications for productivity. Conversely, employees may report 
skill gaps in isolation if (a) the skill gap is genuine but has few implications for productivity 
(that is, if it is of little concern to the firm); (b) the firm lacks the prerequisite communication 
and HRM structures that allow workers to communicate their training needs to their 
employer (c) employers put too much faith in formal education systems and assume that 
gaps are less likely the higher the workforce share of educated labour (d) employee 
responses may reflect future career aspirations more than current job requirements.  
Tables 1 and 2 show the percentages of firms reporting skill gaps based on the perceptions 
of both employers (Table 1) and employees (Table 2). An employer based skill gap is based 
on the firm indicating that one exists, while an employee based skill gap is recorded if more 
than 20 per cent of employees report a deficiency in a particular skill dimension. The 
percentage of firms reporting employee based skill gaps is systematically higher than the 
percentage reporting employer based skill gaps. The areas were skill gaps are more highly 
reported under both indicators are IT and communication and, to a lesser extent, technology 
and management. There is some correspondence between employers’ and employees’ 
perceptions in this respect, but the correlation between the two measures is relatively low: 
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when skill gaps in any particular competency area are identified on the basis of employee 
perceptions, employers will typically also report the skill gap in less than 40 per cent of 
cases. However, when a skill gap is identified on the basis of employer perceptions, in 4 out 
of 6 competency areas, employee based skill gaps were also reported in more than 50 per 
cent of firms. Thus, it is far more common that employees also recognised gaps when 
employers did so than vice versa. For both measurement approaches, the level of agreement 
seems somewhat higher for IT, management or communication.  
In order to gain further insights into the factors that influence agreement between 
employers and workers on training requirements, Table 3 presents the results from a 
multinomial logit model comparing the characteristics of organisations that agree on skill 
gaps (skill gaps agreement). Given that there exist a number of mutually exclusive skill gap 
states (j=1,2,3,4) where 1 refers no skill gaps, 2 refers to skill gaps reported by both 
employees and employers (skill gaps agreement), 3 refers to skill gaps reported by 
employees only and 4 refers to skill gaps reported by employers alone, we estimate out 
models using the following standard multinomial logit approach : 
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We estimate the model separately for each skill dimension (e.g. a skill gap in any area, a skill 
gap in technology, a skill gap in IT, etc) with the reference in the dependent variable being 
‘no gap being reported by either firms or employees in the specific competency area’. When 
presenting the results, we gather all the estimates related from the competency specific 
mutinomial logits and present them in a single table. The results for skill gap agreement are 
reported in table 3 and a number of patterns arise.  Firstly, relative to firms reporting no skill 
gaps of any description, skill gap agreement is, on the whole, more common in firms with 
higher shares of educated and professional workers, in larger firms, those implementing 
shift work practices and / operating collective bargaining mechanisms such as the National 
Wage Agreement and industry level agreements. HRM practices also appear to be an 
important factor in facilitating the mutual recognition of skill gaps among employers and 
workers, with significant effects evident for both performance reviews and change 
consultation; the provision of job descriptions is also important but to a somewhat lesser 
degree. With respect to industrial sector, relative to the Other Services base case, 
agreement was consistently less likely in the Transport / storage, Wholesale / retail and 
Public administration sectors5  
 
                                                          
5  As the data excludes public bodies, semi-state organisations are still present in the data and will be present 
within the Public Administration sector. 
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Table 4 analyses the determinants of firms reporting employee specific gaps relative to the 
base case of firms where there is agreement between employees and employers6. A number 
of common themes become apparent; employees alone are more likely to perceive skill gaps 
in smaller firms, those employing higher proportions of migrant workers7, firms not 
implementing HRM practices, such as performance reviews or the provision of job 
descriptions, firms with lower levels of trade-union density and those not implement formal 
collective wage bargaining arrangements such as the national wage agreement8.  The human 
capital characteristics of the workforce are also found to play a role in explaining employee 
based asymmetries, but the observed patterns are less consistent.  Employee’s specific skill 
gaps in the areas of languages and communication are more common in firms with a higher 
average level of worker experience. Employees in firms employing higher proportions of 
educated labour are more likely to unilaterally report skill gaps in technology and numeracy 
/ literacy; conversely, workers in firms with lower shares of educated labour are more likely 
to unilaterally report skill gaps in IT. The results for literacy and numeracy may seem 
somewhat counter-intuitive; however, evidence from employer surveys find that literacy 
and numeracy problems tend to be reported, at a declining incidence, among workers of all 
levels of education, suggesting that responses to the question are likely to be benchmarked 
against job requirements as opposed to ability levels in basic literacy and numeracy. Finally, 
some sectoral influences were apparent with technology and management related skill gaps 
more likely to be reported by employees only in the Transport sector while communication 
gaps were more common in the Retail sector. 
Table 5 compares the characteristics of firms unilaterally reporting employer skill gaps 
relative again to the base case where both employers and workers agree that a skill deficit 
exists. We see that asymmetries across most skill dimensions are again more common 
                                                          
6  Here we again estimate a series of multinomial logits for each skill area but exclude firms reporting no skill 
gaps and estimate relative to the base case of mutual skill gaps in the respective dimension. 
7  Migrant workers in Ireland are more likely to be educated to post-secondary level relative to natives, 
however, they are also more likely to be employed in elementary occupations despite having relatively more 
schooling. This finding is consistent with the general finding within the literature that migrant workers have a 
higher exposure to overeducation (Lindley, 2009; Kucel and Byrne, 2008; Dex and Lindley, 2007; Battu and 
Sloane, 2004; Alpin et al., 1998;) 
8  Between 1987 and 2008, wage bargaining in Ireland was largely centralised at the national level, through a 
process known as Social Partnership that facilitated a number of national wage agreements. This partnership 
approach, which, involved voluntary negotiations between the Government, main employer bodies and trade 
unions, was introduced by the Government at this time to assist it in moving the country out of the bleak 
economic situation that it found itself in; a period characterised by high inflation, weak economic growth 
and, subsequently, considerable unemployment, mass emigration and unsustainable government borrowing 
and national debt. There have been nine agreements to-date3which has been tailored to medium term 
national economic and social needs, and has often built on its predecessor. Initially, pay and wage issues 
were the core elements of the negotiated agreements; specifically moderate wage increases in exchange for 
reductions in income tax to boost take-home pay. However, as the country recovered and moved into the 
‘Celtic Tiger’ era, the partnership nature of the agreements became deeper and their coverage was extended 
to include various social and welfare issues that either emerged or become more prominent as the economy 
prospered.  Social partnership effectively ended with the onset of the economic downturn in 2009 when the 
Irish Government imposed a series of pay cuts on public sector workers without the agreement of the social 
partners. 
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within smaller organisations and those employing higher proportions of migrants. HRM 
related variables are also important, but in a somewhat different form than in the model 
explaining employee specific gaps. Employer only skill gaps are more common in 
organisations that do not have formal methods of consulting their workers on organisational 
change. The lack of job descriptions is important in the areas of IT and management, while 
the absence of performance reviews tend to increase the incidence of asymmetries in the 
areas of technology and literacy/numeracy. Employers within firms with higher proportions 
of educated labour are less likely to unilaterally report skill gaps in the areas of technology, 
IT and management, suggesting that information asymmetries in these skill dimensions are 
more common within low-skilled organisations. A possible explanation to the observed 
pattern is that skill deficiencies are less obvious to employees in low-skilled jobs due to the 
relatively unsophisticated nature of the products or services they produce. Regarding sector, 
skill gaps unilaterally perceived by employers only were common across most skill 
dimensions in the Transport / storages sector; IT management and communication 
asymmetries were more common in the wholesale / retail sector.  Finally, employers in the 
Financial intermediation and Business services sector were more likely to unilaterally report 
skill gaps in technology. 
Therefore, to conclude, a general finding arising from our research is the importance of 
collective bargaining, HRM practices and firm size in promoting skill gaps agreement or, 
alternatively, an absence of such attributes contributing to information asymmetries.  
Collective bargaining appears to be a particularly important factor in communicating 
employee skill deficiencies and, therefore, fostering agreement on the training requirements 
of workers. Collective bargaining represents an obvious opportunity to discuss skill gaps 
between management and workers’ representatives. Bargaining at the company level could 
have been expected to be the most suitable level for generating skill gaps agreement. 
Contrary to that, our results point to the industry or sector-level bargaining as the most 
suitable scenarios. This result fits with the importance of industry level bargaining in skill 
formation shown in other research. Strong social agents (employers’ associations and trade 
unions) are well-known to be decisive in establishing and renewing vocational training in 
dual systems of vocational training, like Germany (Estevez-Abe, 2000; Culpepper, 1999). It is 
quite possible that collective bargaining at this level is also better than either the company 
level or the national level for diagnosing skill gaps and generating a common understanding 
about them.  The role of national level wage bargaining is somewhat less clear; as it is not 
immediately apparent how such centralised wage negotiations might be conducive to 
agreement on training requirements. It is possible that those firms implementing the 
national wage agreement routinely implement other forms of consultation, not observed 
within our dataset, to compensate for the absence of a firm-level discussion forum and that 
the national wage agreement variable is proxying such an unobserved effect9.  
                                                          
9  Within our data, individual-level agreements constitute the dominant wage bargaining mechanism in the 
private sector with, on average, 49 per cent of employees within the typical firm covered by such 
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Unlike collective bargaining, HRM is a unilateral effort of the company to investigate the skill 
gaps among the workforce. It is reasonable to think that companies with performance 
review among the workforce, where job description is more extended, and where there is 
consultation on organisational change are also companies where information on skill gaps as 
perceived by employees arrives more easily to management, thus facilitating skill gaps 
agreement between employers and employees. In a recent report on skill mismatch in UK 
and Europe, Bevan and Cowling provided evidence of how mechanisms established to set 
performance objectives and employee performance evaluation were used to detect skill 
gaps in one retail and one publishing company (Bevan and Cowling, 2007).   
The consistent firm size effect is likely to reflect the more formalised management and 
quality control structures that tend to be more heavily present within larger firms, which, in 
turn, facilitate more routine monitoring of employee performance and the detection of skill 
gaps. Finally, the generally inverse relationship between the share of educated workers and 
the prevalence of unilateral skill gaps could also be related to the structure of 
communication channels between management and the company. Highly-skilled workers 
(college graduates) are likely to occupy positions closer to the hierarchy. Everything else 
being equal, it is thus to be expected that a common understanding about the skill gaps 
affecting them is more likely to arise between workers and the company. 
The relative impacts of skill gaps on firm-level performance 
While the analysis of the factors driving agreement and disagreement on skill gaps is of 
major interest, it would lack any strong implication for policy if the impacts of skill gaps on 
outcome variables are broadly consistent irrespective of the measurement approach. This 
has been the case within the overeducation literature; for instance, there are three central 
measurement approaches to overeducation all of which tend to generate consistent impacts 
on earnings despite being poorly correlated (McGuinness, 2006). To examine the issue in the 
context of skill gaps, we include three different indicators of skill gap in a labour cost model. 
We consider: a) an indicator of a gap perceived both by employers and employees, b) an 
indicator of a gap based on the employer measure only perceptions, and finally c) an 
indicator of a gap based on employee perceptions only. It is reasonable to assume that the 
mutual skill gap variable represents a genuine measure of a skill deficiency at the level of the 
firm. As discussed earlier, measures based on employee or employer perceptions alone are 
potentially prone to subjective bias. The objective of the exercise is to establish the impact 
of genuine skill gaps on performance and the degree to which such impacts are sufficiently 
captured by measures restricted to stand alone employer and employee perceptions. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
agreements. The average coverage level of the NWA was 30 percent, while industry and business-level 
agreements each had an average coverage level of less than 10 per cent. 
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When estimating the labour cost and training equations, we control for the potential non-
random relationship between skill gaps and productivity using the Heckman procedure 
(Heckman, 1978). We ensured that the model was properly identified by including a number 
of variables related to the probability of a skill gap that were subsequently excluded from 
the average wage cost equation10. The first stage equations from the Heckman procedure, 
which estimate the probability that a firm will experience a skill gap per se, are insightful in 
their own right and are presented in Table 6. The results vary somewhat depending on 
whether the dependant variable relates to mutually agreed gaps or those based on 
employer or employee responses. With respect to mutually agreed skill gaps, these are more 
common in firms with higher proportions of educated labour, lower levels of trade-union 
density, larger firms, those implementing HRM initiatives, implementing national \ industry 
wage agreements and employing a high proportion of shift-workers. The equation based on 
employee responses is similar to that for mutually agreed gaps; however, the variables 
capturing forms of wage bargaining and trade-union density are no longer significant in this 
model. The model estimated on employer responses is quite distinct from the other two; 
employer reported skill gaps were unrelated to the educational structure of the firm. 
Employer skill gaps were correlated with firm size, HRM initiatives, wage bargaining 
structures and trade-union density. Interestingly, sectoral effects were not heavily evident in 
any of the skill gap models.  
The results from the labour costs models are presented in table 7 and comply with 
expectations. Skill gaps relate to a gap being reported in one or more competency areas. 
Average labour costs are positively related to the shares of educated workers, experienced 
workers, male employees and also with firm size. Average labour costs are lower in firms 
implementing the national wage agreement (see McGuinness et al (2011), and those 
employing higher shares of part-time and migrant labour. After controlling for such 
variables, mutual skill gaps and those perceived by employers contribute to higher average 
labour costs; the gaps perceived by employees only are not statistically significant. The 
results from the selection adjusted average labour cost equations generally support the view 
that skill gaps are damaging for competitiveness, with deficiencies in the competencies of 
existing staff raising average labour costs by approximately 25 under the combined measure, 
with the result broadly reflected in the equation utilising employer perceptions of skill gaps. 
The lambda terms indicate that the existence of skill gaps is non-random with respect to 
average labour costs, as those firms where skill gaps are present tend to have lower ex ante 
labour cost i.e., they are more concentrated towards the lower end of the value added 
spectrum. Table 8 summarises the results from the labour cost models estimated to include 
controls for skill gaps across the various competency dimensions.  In general, with the 
exception of IT, the results support the view that skill gaps in specific areas do not tend to 
adversely affect wage competitiveness; rather it is a combination of skill gaps across a range 
of competency areas that drive up average labour costs. 
                                                          
10 Essentially we exclude the HRM related variables from the labour costs equation. Results available from the 
authors. 
11 
Table 9 shows the impact of skill gaps on training costs and, once again, we see that that 
significant impacts are present in models 1 and 2 which incorporate employer perceptions, 
but not in model 3, where skill gaps are measured in terms of employee perceptions only. 
The results indicate that the existence of skill gaps within firms raised average training costs 
by between €1,059 and €1,038 euro (2006 prices).  The treatment terns are again negative 
suggesting that firms experiencing skill gaps typically have lower than average training 
expenditures. Finally Table 10 looks at the impact of specific competency based skill gaps on 
training costs with the models suggesting that deficiencies in technology, IT and 
management all potentially raise training costs within firms. 
Summing up, we have found that the skill gaps commonly perceived by employers and 
employees, or by employers only, are the ones that seem relevant for both labour and 
training costs, whereas skills gaps perceived by employees only are not relevant in these 
respects. The results suggest that skill gaps are damaging to firm level competiveness and 
also that measures of skill gaps based on employee perceptions may be prone to subjective 
bias. 
4 Conclusions and Policy Recommendations 
Skill gaps describe a situation whereby the skill levels of the existing workforce are perceived 
as insufficient to meet the productivity requirements of the firm. To date, the literature has 
presented only descriptive evidence of the impacts of skill gaps on firm-level performance. 
Using to employer-employee matched data from the 2006 Irish National Employment 
Survey, our research has first explored the rate of agreement between employers’ and 
employees’ perception of skill gaps at the firm level. It has also explored the drivers or 
determinants of this consistency. The research then assessed the extent to which either 
employers’ or employees’ perception of skill gaps is more decisive in explaining firm level 
performance, looking at the degree to which each perception helps explaining labour costs 
and training expenditures. 
Our results show that it is more common that employees recognised skill gaps when 
management do so than vice versa. The level of agreement was higher for skills or 
competences related to IT, management or communication. After introducing a number of 
firm-level controls (size, sector...) and human capital controls (proportion of workers with 
different levels of education, share of immigrants...) into a multivariate framework, the main 
factors driving the agreement between employers’ and employees’ perception of skill gaps 
seem to be factors related to the degree of communication between management and the 
company. Human resource management processes and collective bargaining stand out 
among the factors that facilitate the mutual recognition of skill gaps or, alternatively, the 
absence of such arrangements tend to drive asymmetries where employers report problems 
not perceived by employees and vice versa. In the case of collective bargaining, it seems that 
collective bargaining at the sector or industry level is more decisive for facilitating this 
agreement than bargaining at other levels. This fits with the beneficial role of sector level 
agreement for skill formation found in other research. Sector or industry level is possibly the 
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most suitable level to communicate or share information on skill gaps between employers 
and workers’ representatives, and this common understanding of skill gaps is possibly 
reflected in the responses that employees and employers have given in the NES survey. 
Firms implementing the national wage agreement were also more likely to have greater 
mutual agreement in the area of skill gaps, however, this impact is more difficult to explain 
and while it may be driven by an omitted variable effect it is an area for future research. 
While fostering or promoting, social dialogue at a sector level could be a way of diagnosing 
skill gaps among their workforce, a well-developed human resource management works in 
the same direction. Performance evaluation, job description and consultation on job change 
are demonstrated to be valuable ways for management to diagnose the skill gaps among 
their workforce. 
The proportion of skilled or highly-educated workers employed within the firm is also 
important for explaining skill gaps agreement / disagreement. To the extent that highly-
educated workers occupy positions inside or near the top of the company hierarchy and, 
thus, can better transmit or share their perception of skill gaps with the ones in charge of 
the company, this can also be read as a result confirming the importance of communication 
for explaining higher levels of agreement on skill gaps. 
The second part of the analysis has demonstrated a statistically significant inflationary effect 
of skill gaps on both average labour costs and training costs, even after controlling for the 
fact that the skill gaps are not randomly distributed with respect to the outcome variables. 
This in itself is an important finding with substantial implications for policy. However, 
potentially different conclusions can be drawn depending on the approach adopted for 
identifying skill gaps. Only gaps perceived by employers only, or commonly perceived by 
employers and employees, lead to a finding of an inflationary impact on training and labour 
costs.  No impacts are found when the analysis is carried out using employee perceptions 
alone, In sum, when asking ourselves whom to ask, or where to look at, in order to assess 
skill gaps, it seems more advisable to look at employers’ perception, at least if we are 
concerned with firm-level performance. The fact that employees’ perception of skill gaps 
cannot explain firm-level performance as well as employers’ perception could be explained 
either because employees overestimate their competency levels, because they fail to 
recognise instances where their skill gaps are important for productivity or because 
employee responses actually capture future career aspirations, more than current job 
requirements.  The identification of the sources of potential subjective bias in employee 
perceptions of their training needs is an area for further research. 
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Table 1: % Firms reporting Employer based Skill Gaps 
 Incidence % Also reporting Employee based gaps 
Any 68 83.3 
Technology 28.5 54 
IT 35.1 60.7 
Management 27.9 52.9 
Languages 18.3 38.3 
Communication 32.1 64.5 
Numeracy / Lit 8.1 33.6 
N 4035 100  
 
Table 2: % Firms reporting Employee based Skill Gaps 
 Incidence % Also reporting Employer based gaps 
Any 80 70.9 
Technology 44.4 34.8 
IT 47.3 45 
Management 43.2 34.1 
Languages 26.2 26.7 
Communication 54.3 38.1 
Numeracy / Lit 29 9.3 
N 4035 100 
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Table 3: Factors Influencing agreement on skill gaps 
VARIABLES Gap both Tech IT Manage Language Comm Num \ lit 
average experience 0.003 -0.005 0.022** 0.010 -0.024* -0.003 0.035** 
% male employment 0.058 0.950*** -0.112 0.046 0.052 -0.177 -0.117 
% PT employment 0.543* -0.018 0.080 -0.101 0.286 0.439 -0.186 
% Basic education 0.176 0.416 1.341*** 0.549 0.077 0.326 -0.561 
% high school 0.859*** 0.641 2.013*** 1.719*** 0.826 1.171*** 0.379 
% post sec 1.254*** 1.325*** 2.066*** 1.491*** 1.674*** 1.277*** 0.791 
% sub degree 2.011*** 2.017*** 3.735*** 3.601*** 2.031*** 2.460*** 1.358 
% graduate 2.087*** 2.014*** 3.539*** 3.525*** 2.391*** 2.163*** 1.875** 
individual bargain -0.000 -0.000 0.002 -0.000 -0.003 -0.000 0.001 
bus level bargain 0.007 0.010** 0.011*** 0.006 0.007 0.009** 0.012** 
industry level bargain 0.007*** 0.007** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008** 0.008*** 0.009** 
Nat wage agree 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 
Other agree -0.006* -0.008* -0.005 -0.008* -0.006 -0.007* -0.012 
% Shift work 0.942*** 1.083*** 0.655** 0.933*** 1.513*** 1.272*** 2.010*** 
% in prof bodies 0.457 0.872** 0.463 0.810* 0.061 0.210 0.572 
Firm size (logged) 0.657*** 0.766*** 0.678*** 0.876*** 0.638*** 0.899*** 0.678*** 
T U density -0.000 -0.003 0.002 -0.004 -0.001 -0.001 -0.006 
% Migrants -0.439* -0.531 -1.268*** -1.065*** 1.357*** -0.531* 0.230 
% performance review 0.007*** 0.012*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.009*** 0.011*** 
% job description 0.003* 0.001 0.004** 0.007*** 0.006** 0.004* 0.002 
% consult change 1.002*** 1.215*** 1.099*** 1.788*** 0.698** 1.180*** 1.614*** 
Manufacturing -0.805 -1.293 -1.251 -1.752 -0.934 -1.233 -13.363 
Electricity \ Gas \Water 0.201 -0.110 0.399 -0.049 0.273 -0.453 -0.314 
Construction 8.913 9.068 8.413 10.549 -1.895 8.147  
Wholesale \ Retail -0.795** -0.955** -1.079*** -1.088*** -1.003** -1.594*** -1.051* 
Hotels \ Restaurants -0.411 -1.309*** -0.147 -0.511 -0.543 -0.147 -0.877* 
Transport \ Storage -1.150*** -3.051*** -1.647*** -1.090*** -0.928** -0.742** -2.173*** 
Financial Inter -0.791* -1.797*** -0.309 -0.702 -0.812 -0.530 -3.207** 
Business Services 1.060 0.109 1.392 0.724 0.873 1.219 0.352 
Public Admin -0.713** -1.041*** -0.442 -0.788** -0.439 -0.868** -1.061* 
Education -1.223* -2.283*** -0.910 -1.547** -1.133 -0.898 -2.001 
Health -0.382 -0.504 -0.003 -0.600 -0.661 -0.395 -0.298 
Constant -1.264** -2.902*** -3.890*** -4.640*** -3.304*** -3.012*** -4.673*** 
Observations 4035 2765 3000 2,743 1,792 3,145 1,666 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4: Factors Influencing Perceived Gaps among Employees Only 
VARIABLES Tot Gap Tech IT Manage    Language  Comm  Num \ lit 
average experience 0.014** 0.017** -0.000 0.002 0.026** 0.028*** -0.023 
% male employment -0.376*** -0.435** 0.023 0.043 -0.035 -0.108 0.147 
% PT employment -0.367** 0.319 -0.126 0.294 -0.073 0.043 0.415 
% Basic education 0.535* 0.948** -1.142*** -0.039 0.701 0.444 2.055** 
% high school -0.059 0.815** -1.082*** -0.469 0.372 -0.258 2.003** 
% post sec 0.088 0.768* -0.870** -0.238 -0.235 -0.230 1.324 
% sub degree 0.327 0.961** -0.903** -0.909** 0.785 -0.069 2.319** 
% graduate 0.219 0.986** -0.844** -0.806* 0.488 0.431 1.431* 
individual bargain -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.003 -0.001 -0.003 
bus level bargain -0.000 -0.002 -0.004** -0.001 0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
industry level bargain -0.004** -0.000 -0.001 -0.005** -0.005** -0.003* -0.004 
Nat wage agree -0.003** -0.002 -0.002* -0.002 -0.004* -0.003*** -0.005* 
Other agree 0.001 0.001 -0.002 0.004 0.003 0.002 0.007 
% Shift work -0.256 -0.148 0.327 0.332 -0.548* -0.082 -0.371 
% in prof bodies -0.310 -0.169 0.225 -0.273 0.763* -0.005 0.275 
Firm size (logged) -0.148*** -0.186*** -0.051 -0.268*** -0.024 -0.272*** -0.084 
T U density 0.005** 0.005** -0.003 0.002 0.001 0.005** 0.003 
% Migrants -0.474** -0.114 0.593** 0.090 -1.515*** -0.500** -1.500*** 
% performance review -0.004*** -0.006*** -0.001 -0.002* 0.000 -0.003** -0.005** 
% job description -0.003*** 0.001 -0.003** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.002** 0.002 
% consult change -0.095 -0.269 -0.096 -0.583*** -0.056 -0.247 -0.773* 
Manufacturing -0.120 -0.298 -0.202 0.226 0.460 -0.767 10.566 
Electricity \ Gas \Water -0.132 -0.053 -0.111 0.254 -0.497 0.469* -0.066 
Construction 0.165 -0.253 -0.037 -1.128 8.076 0.761  
Wholesale \ Retail 0.279 -0.078 0.304 0.457* -0.031 0.712*** -0.054 
Hotels \ Restaurants 0.092 0.420** -0.080 0.240 -0.012 -0.308* 0.231 
Transport \ Storage 0.587*** 1.201*** 0.391 0.566** -0.272 0.001 0.702 
Financial Inter -0.149 0.314 -0.199 0.156 -0.033 -0.396 2.109* 
Business Services 0.101 0.100 0.215 0.380 0.008 0.207 0.764 
Public Admin 0.078 -0.050 -0.004 0.325 -0.308 0.201 0.444 
Education 0.358 0.704 -0.008 0.692 0.383 -0.059 0.918 
Health 0.027 -0.076 -0.291 0.124 0.173 -0.017 -0.719 
Constant -0.308 0.524 1.493*** 2.196*** 1.135 1.168*** 1.942* 
        
Observations 3,795 2,525 2,760 2,503 1,552 2,905 1,426 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Table 5: Factors Influencing Perceived Gaps among Employers Only 
VARIABLES Tot both Tech IT Manage    Language  Comm  Num \ lit 
average experience -0.004 0.002 -0.007 -0.019** 0.017 0.002 -0.035* 
% male employment -0.569*** -1.718*** -0.070 -0.567** -0.119 -0.021 0.378 
% PT employment -0.273 0.122 0.237 0.638** -0.253 -0.179 -0.127 
% Basic education -0.436 -1.355*** -1.485*** -0.668 -0.275 -0.212 -0.272 
% high school -0.657** -0.299 -1.703*** -0.976* -0.554 -0.151 0.401 
% post sec -1.255*** -1.397*** -1.512*** -0.562 -0.862 -0.133 -0.332 
% sub degree -1.453*** -1.093** -2.648*** -2.191*** -0.515 -0.221 -0.202 
% graduate -1.604*** -0.951** -2.476*** -1.997*** -2.131*** -0.347 -1.096 
individual bargain -0.001 -0.000 -0.003** -0.000 0.005** -0.001 -0.002 
bus level bargain 0.000 -0.004 -0.003 0.000 -0.005 -0.003 -0.008 
industry level bargain -0.004* 0.001 -0.001 -0.005** -0.006** -0.002 -0.006 
Nat wage agree 0.001 0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 0.002 0.000 
Other agree 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.006 0.003 0.004 0.010 
% Shift work -0.824*** -0.303 0.289 0.145 -0.867*** -0.749*** -0.770 
% in prof bodies -1.260*** -1.548*** -0.676** -1.077*** 0.242 0.066 0.721 
Firm size (logged) -0.429*** -0.327*** -0.013 -0.039 0.168* -0.353*** 0.092 
T U density -0.000 0.003 -0.003 0.001 -0.002 0.004 0.007 
% Migrants -0.646** -0.014 0.869*** -0.587* -1.777*** -0.053 -1.729*** 
% performance review -0.001 -0.005*** 0.000 -0.001 -0.002 -0.000 -0.010*** 
% job description -0.004*** 0.000 -0.004** -0.006*** -0.004* -0.002 0.004 
% consult change -0.970*** -0.990*** -0.887*** -1.224*** -0.116 -0.857*** -1.377*** 
Manufacturing 0.789 1.293 1.345 0.743 0.490 0.653 10.641 
Electricity \ Gas \Water 0.085 0.594* 0.245 0.428 0.160 1.121*** -0.030 
Construction -7.855 -9.630 1.952 -10.367 8.696 2.645  
Wholesale \ Retail 0.443* 0.549* 0.643** 0.610** 0.359 1.104*** 0.154 
Hotels \ Restaurants -0.151 0.750*** 0.068 -0.022 0.165 -0.128 0.296 
Transport \ Storage 0.854*** 2.104*** 0.941*** 0.078 0.663* 0.463* 1.494** 
Financial Inter 0.435 1.146*** 0.177 -0.070 0.477 0.421 2.347* 
Business Services -1.574* 1.068** -1.866** 0.330 0.108 -1.029* 0.599 
Public Admin -0.244 0.548** -0.089 0.232 -0.616 0.181 0.684 
Education 0.086 0.447 0.100 -0.052 0.423 -0.105 0.916 
Health -0.013 0.249 0.150 0.100 0.477 0.288 -0.274 
Constant 1.643*** 2.767*** 2.191*** 2.997*** 1.444** 0.914* 2.174* 
        
Observations 3,795 2,525 2,760 2,503 1,552 2,905 1,426 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Table 6: The Probability of Experiencing a Skill Gap (Marginal Effects) 
VARIABLES Mutual Firm Worker 
    
average experience -0.002 -0.003** 0.001 
% male employment 0.064** 0.027 0.029 
% PT employment 0.043 0.052 0.003 
% Basic education 0.025 -0.070 0.080** 
% high school 0.138** 0.032 0.125*** 
% post sec 0.172*** -0.004 0.180*** 
% sub degree 0.188*** 0.008 0.225*** 
% graduate 0.153** -0.010 0.207*** 
individual bargain 0.000 0.000 0.000 
bus level bargain 0.000 0.000 0.000 
industry level bargain 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000 
Nat wage agree 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000 
Other agree -0.000 0.000 -0.000 
% Shift work 0.093*** 0.044 0.063*** 
% in prof bodies 0.092** 0.015 0.089*** 
Firm size (logged) 0.043*** 0.022*** 0.042*** 
T U density -0.001** -0.001* -0.000 
% Migrants 0.048 0.021 -0.010 
% performance review 0.128*** 0.051* 0.102*** 
% job description 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000** 
% consult change 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000** 
Manufacturing 0.138 0.161  
Electricity \ Gas \Water 0.137 0.138 0.045 
Construction 0.092 0.111 0.006 
Wholesale \ Retail 0.165 0.137 0.060 
Hotels \ Restaurants 0.067 0.104 0.004 
Transport \ Storage 0.137 0.127 0.027 
Financial Inter 0.167 0.108 0.106*** 
Business Services 0.147 0.122 0.055 
Public Admin 0.106 0.093 0.023 
Education 0.113 0.120 0.011 
Health 0.150 0.132 0.057 
    
Observations 4,035 4,035 4,030 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 7: Average Labour Cost Models 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Base Firm employee 
    
average experience 0.013*** 0.014*** 0.012*** 
% male employment 0.111*** 0.116*** 0.133*** 
% PT employment -0.179*** -0.185*** -0.171*** 
% basic education 0.056 0.089 0.093 
% high school 0.123* 0.147** 0.210*** 
% post sec 0.083 0.129* 0.197** 
% sub degree 0.180** 0.224*** 0.313*** 
% graduate 0.405*** 0.448*** 0.524*** 
individual bargain 0.000 0.000 0.000** 
bus level bargain 0.000 0.000 0.000 
industry level bargain -0.001* -0.001** -0.000 
Nat wage agree -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.000* 
Other agree -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
% Shift work -0.105** -0.096** -0.066 
% in prof bodies 0.076 0.092* 0.124** 
Firm size (logged) 0.034*** 0.037*** 0.057*** 
T U density 0.001 0.001 0.000 
% Migrants -0.175*** -0.170*** -0.167*** 
% consult change 0.074* 0.087** 0.139*** 
Gap both 0.252*   
lamda Gap both -0.158*   
firm gap  0.340**  
lamda firm gap  -0.224**  
employee gap   -0.197 
lamda employee gap   0.132 
    
Constant 2.387*** 2.258*** 2.452*** 
 (0.118) (0.127) (0.125) 
Observations 4035 4035 4035 
R-squared 0.237 0.238 0.237 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Models include industry controls which are not reported  
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Table 8: Impact on Average Labour Cost of Individual Skill Gap Effects (selection adjusted) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Base Firm employee 
    
Technology 0.080 -0.022 -0.039 
IT 0.356* 0.555 0.276 
Management 0.171 -0.040 0.012 
Languages -0.373** -0.228 -0.058 
Communication -0.038 -0.025 -0.079 
Numeracy / Lit -0.604 -0.613 0.133 
    
Constant 2.356*** 2.249*** 2.471*** 
    
Observations 4035 4035 4035 
R-squared 0.251 0.249 0.250 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 9: Average Training Cost Models 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Base Firm employee 
    
average experience 1.958 3.444** -0.843 
% male employment -32.534 0.962 31.479 
% PT employment -175.882*** -191.701*** -146.092*** 
% basic education -14.695 97.989* -4.966 
% high school -163.373*** -54.443 -22.749 
% post sec -165.365*** 24.030 6.108 
% sub degree -20.827 173.076** 175.436 
% graduate 2.461 181.931** 177.122 
individual bargain 0.270 0.340 0.682** 
bus level bargain 0.378 0.292 0.938 
industry level bargain -0.177 -0.087 0.929* 
Nat wage agree -0.248 -0.311 0.534 
Other agree 0.098 -0.123 0.287 
% Shift work -166.208*** -115.780** -86.907 
% in prof bodies 178.772** 253.380*** 281.137*** 
Firm size (logged) 48.299*** 68.476*** 101.170*** 
T U density 0.042 0.028 -0.826* 
% Migrants -103.615** -75.741 -52.632 
% consult change -77.108* -2.324 46.517 
Gap both 1,059.139***   
lamda Gap both -600.125***   
firm gap  1,138.696***  
lamda firm gap  -632.383***  
employee gap   125.222 
lamda employee gap   -55.123 
    
Constant -273.128 -709.983*** -293.646 
 (229.422) (242.755) (236.686) 
Observations 4035 4035 4035 
R-squared 0.102 0.102 0.091 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 10: Impact on Average Training Costs of Individual Skill Gap Effects (selection 
adjusted) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Base Firm employee 
    
Technology 678.729*** 58.573** 815.384*** 
IT 686.316** -8.008 64.308 
Management 666.589* 1,854.322*** 522.366 
Languages 214.557 -64.914 -623.507 
Communication -23.022 49.918 468.758 
Numeracy / Lit 401.712 -572.462 397.271 
    
Constant -168.646 -645.738** -252.571 
    
Observations 4035 4035 4035 
R-squared 0.118 0.115 0.250 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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